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Cases vs. Statistics: 
A Crux in the History of Medicine 
 
No one wants to be a statistic.  When statistics were introduced into medicine 300 years 
ago, however, they represented both an effort to confirm lives saved and a departure from the 
all-too-powerful tradition of Humoralism. 
 Dating to the days of Hippocrates, Humoralism refers to the theories and practices 
centered on the belief that the balance or imbalance of certain cardinal bodily fluids (“humors”) 
determines health.  (By the same token, contextual factors such as diet and climate which 
influence these dynamics were important to humoral thinking.)  While Humoralism underwrote 
the general use of evacuative treatments to discharge excesses and pent-up matter, it also 
complicated the comparison of cases, defined as each of them is by its particularities.  The 
humoral outlook had such staying power that it persisted in one guise or another for millennia, 
through the successive turns and epochs of medical history. 
Here I discuss the first numerical tabulation of medical data on record, a technique 
contrary to the tradition of Humoralism.  The setting was the inoculation debate in England in 
the 1720s.  It was the sheer scale of smallpox mortality that inspired the use of statistics to 





Following the introduction of inoculation by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu upon her 
return from Constantinople. and the inoculation of two granddaughters of George I, the 
procedure began to be performed here and there in England in the early 1720s.  Among the 
first inoculators was the Yorkshire physician Thomas Nettleton.  At the outset Nettleton 
believed that if inoculation were managed carefully enough, there would be no casualties.  
Realizing that no human work is perfect, however, he soon came to feel that if any should die 
as a result of inoculation, it would be excusable because inoculation so greatly benefits the 
public in general.  “Whenever any shall happen to miscarry under this operation, that will 
indeed be very unfortunate and ill, but in this case you will have recourse to the merchant’s 
logic; state the account of profit and loss to find on which side the balance lies with respect to 
the public, and form a judgement accordingly.”2  So Nettleton wrote in a private letter, not a 
pamphlet.  No doubt many of his fellow physicians would have balked at the reduction of 
medical judgment to the lowly art of bookkeeping. 
But there is this much to be said for bookkeeping: it uses numbers with care and 
precision.  The inoculation debate saw the wildly erratic use of statistics on both sides.  A 
strident opponent of inoculation, Thomas Howgrave, asserted that only one person dies out of 
18 stricken with smallpox (a gross underestimate) and that inoculation itself poses a much 
greater danger (a gross exaggeration).3  Another critic, Isaac Massey, stoutly maintained that of 
every 100 inoculations, only 40 induce “true” smallpox, a fact plucked out of thin air.4  Voltaire, 
a proponent of inoculation and great critic of nonsense, asserted nonsensically that 60 of every 
100 persons contract smallpox, and of these 60, 20 die and 20 more are scarred for life, so that, 
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in all. 20% of the population either die of or are disfigured by smallpox.5  These debaters seem 
out of their element using numbers at all.  Nettleton, by contrast, meticulously calculated 
smallpox mortality in his region, if only because inoculation could not be rationally evaluated 
otherwise.  With the novel procedure on trial and local opinion against him, he had to be 
careful, just as he had to be prepared to explain any case that might go amiss. 
Accordingly, though Nettleton mentions the total of his successes (“upwards of forty”) 
but once in an interim report of April 1722, he delves into the case of a child who died after, but 
not because of, inoculation.  Her brother had just died of smallpox, Nettleton accepted her for 
inoculation with reluctance (knowing that if she too died, he would be blamed and the 
inoculation campaign would suffer), and her symptoms emerged much too soon after incision 
to have arisen from the procedure.6  Because the child’s death was not caused by inoculation, 
Nettleton did not have to argue that it was overbalanced by many successes.  Meanwhile, his 
work continued without incident,7 and by December 1722 he could report that none of 61 
persons he inoculated died as a result of the procedure, whereas almost one in five who 
contracted natural smallpox in his vicinity perished.   
Knowing that his work needed to be replicated, Nettleton relayed these figures to the 
secretary of the Royal Society, the mathematician and physician James Jurin,8 who in turn 
solicited reports from inoculators in the four corners of the kingdom.  The public advertisement 
Jurin first placed in 1723 does not inquire about the condition of the subject, a topic of 
traditional concern to medicine. 
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All persons concerned in the practice of inoculating the small pox are desired to keep a 
register of the names and ages of every person inoculated, the place where it is done, 
the manner of the operation, the days of sickening and of the eruption, the sort of small 
pox that is produced, and the event [that is, outcome].9   
 
Even while asking inoculators to keep careful records, Jurin seeks no information about the 
constitution or health of the inoculee.  In the event an inoculee dies following the procedure, 
he does ask his correspondents to send “a particular relation of the case”—a sort of narrative 
post mortem—so that he, in turn, can set the facts before the public.  But such cases turned out 
to be rare, while, conversely, the successes were too many to allow a detailed account of each 
and every one.  Being surgeons and apothecaries, not physicians,10 most of the “persons 
concerned in the practice of inoculating the small pox” in England at the time were not really 
the party to provide a medical history or commentary anyway.  In some instances recorded by 
Jurin, inoculation was performed by women—an echo of the practice originally imported into 
England.  
A few years before Jurin issued his call for data, a letter to the Royal Society reported 
that inoculation as practiced in Constantinople for 40 years not only protects against smallpox, 
but does so regardless of the subject’s “temperament” and “even in the worst constitution of 
the air,” quite as if the procedure cut through the daunting complexities of humoral medicine.11  
Also by report, this practice was conducted by a certain Greek woman.  At the end of an 
impressive statistical argument for inoculation published in 1723, Jurin celebrates the work of 
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this anonymous heroine who personally inoculated “many thousands” in and around 
Constantinople without so much as a single casualty.12    
Though Jurin’s own numbers can’t equal this record, he does find inoculation far less 
dangerous than smallpox per se, even with unselected subjects.  “Of persons of all ages taken ill 
of natural small pox, there will die of that distemper, one in five or six, or two in eleven,” while 
“of persons of all ages inoculated, without regard to the healthiness or unhealthiness of the 
subject, as was practiced in New England, there will die one in sixty.”13  (The corresponding 
figure for England, where inoculation is performed more judiciously, is one in 91.)  Note the 
neutralizing of the very issue a physician would usually concentrate on: the state of the subject.  
While Jurin does suggest that fatalities in New England may be owing to the practice of 
inoculating the weak and the strong alike, he isn’t about to construct separate tables for less 
hardy and more hardy inoculees.  The technique of tabulation itself works against the use of 
such fuzzy categories.  But while the statistics may be as precise as Jurin can make them, figures 
like one in 60 (or one in 91) should be taken with a sprinkling of salt.  Not only do they refer to 
suspected, not verified, inoculation fatalities, but they are subject to change from one year to 
the next, and given the paucity of even alleged fatalities, even a slight change will dramatically 
alter the ratio itself, as Jurin well knew.  (Two fewer alleged fatalities in New England at the 
time Jurin gathered his statistics would have reduced the ratio there from one in 60 to one in 
100.) 
Where Nettleton came to believe that inoculation was of great benefit to humanity 
even if some subjects happened to die, Jurin computed as best he could the magnitude of that 
general benefit.  Evidently he felt that while the interpretation of a handful of troubling cases 
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might be open to dispute, the overall verdict in favor of inoculation was numerically self-
evident.14  A critic at the time might have argued that although Jurin signs himself MD, he 
writes not as a physician but merely as a calculator (as we now say, a bean-counter).  The 
foremost critic of inoculation, the physician William Wagstaffe, went on the attack even before 
Jurin had collected his data, reaffirming all the traditional considerations ignored in a table in 
the interest of numerical clarity.15  Wagstaffe contests the inoculators’ reports in detail and on 
every point, leaving the distinct impression that if each inoculation tabulated as a success were 
well looked into, most and possibly all would be found not to be success stories at all.  The 
proper way to analyze cases is as cases, not in aggregate.  In all, Wagstaffe deems inoculation 
not a safeguard against smallpox, but a lethal danger to the subject and the community.  It is 
only by good luck, he asserts, that the royal family suffered no loss by subjecting two of its own 
to inoculation.  
 Presumably because many followed the royal example, Wagstaffe regards inoculation as 
a fashion, and, mindful as he is of the complex determinants of health, he takes a highly 
skeptical view of this behavioral trend.  As if laying down a principle, he asserts in the first few 
sentences of his pamphlet that without conducting repeated trials “on persons of different 
ages, sexes, and constitutions, in different seasons of the year, and in different climates,” it is 
impossible to establish the safety and efficacy of inoculation.  (The mention of climate, a 
traditional humoral topic, appears to be an allusion to the Turkish origins of the British 
practice.)  In and of itself, the author’s emphasis on all these variables declares his opposition to 
statistical generalities.  Wagstaffe would never agree to vacate the entire conceptual 
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framework of Humoralism in order to produce a stark numerical comparison resembling a 
merchant’s balance sheet.16   
Wagstaffe proceeds to argue that it is reckless to inoculate without knowing “the state 
of the humours” of the individual subject—reckless if only because the constitution of each one 
of us has a point of vulnerability, an Achilles heel.  “For as there is no man but has some 
imbecility, some little weakness more in one part than another, so distempers . . . often prove 
fatal by finding out the foible of our constitution, and attacking us in the most unguarded 
places.”  Only the conscientious practitioner of humoral medicine can properly watch out for 
the fatal flaw that is part of every constitution.  The heedless empiric who inoculates people in 
lots, disregarding their particularities as Jurin does in tabulating cases (to say nothing of the 
Greek woman who inoculates by the thousand), will only sow death.     
In rebuttal of the claim that inoculation confers immunity to smallpox, Wagstaffe refers 
to a case known to him in which a girl of twelve contracted the disease some months after 
being inoculated.  He comments, “One example of this kind destroys the certainty of 
inoculation’s preventing the small pox, as much as a thousand.”  If one case equals a thousand, 
then of course statistics have no meaning.  Fittingly, Wagstaffe cites almost no statistics over 
the course of a formidable argument rich in cases.17  Whereas Jurin is willing to let certain cases 
count against him because the statistics still speak overwhelmingly in favor of inoculation, 
Wagstaffe grants nothing and argues over everything.  But while he may have won the debate 
rhetorically, in other respects he lost.  As the decades passed and it became clear that 
inoculation did in fact protect against the terrible scourge of smallpox (the only such safeguard 
known until the advent of vaccination), the practice found growing acceptance.  More 
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fundamentally, Jurin (and Nettleton) anticipated the increasing use of statistics later in the 18th 
century to order medical knowledge,18 a development that not only marked progress but held 
the potential for more.  A statistical summary by Jurin is something like a 21st-century summary 




In the public and private correspondence between Jurin and Nettleton, the analysis of 
cases and the compilation of statistics seem to run in opposite directions, with disturbing cases 
revealed upon examination as spurious or questionably relevant, and inoculation statistics 
becoming ever more general and compelling.  Similarly, in Jurin’s annual reports on the state of 
inoculation, cases give rise to involved discussion and chains of documents, while statistics 
illuminate.  Yet the case remained the unit of medicine.  Too securely established to be shaken 
even by so momentous a feat as the prevention of smallpox, Humoralism stood as before.   
Just as inoculation was an empirical practice with no connection to humoral medicine 
and no support in medical theory, so it caught on without prejudice to Humoralism.  A physician 
who corresponded with Jurin thought one of his inoculees, a man “of sanguine constitution,” 
would have passed through his case of induced smallpox more easily if he had “been bled and 
vomited in the beginning.”19  The surgeon Charles Maitland, the first to perform inoculation in 
England, argued that inducing a preventive case of smallpox ought to be no more objectionable 
than bleeding and other evacuations; in effect, it is simply an extension of customary practice.20  
Nettleton himself, Jurin’s original informant, mentions diet and climate, bleeding and purging in 
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his first public account of inoculation—though he also notes that many inoculees had “no 
preparation at all,” that he “very rarely saw occasion for any medicines in the course of the 
distemper,” and that differences of constitution had little or no effect on the eruption of pox.21 
It is worth emphasizing just how sharply the new way of statistics diverged from case-
medicine.  A physician in Kent wrote Jurin asking “whether you would admit of [inoculation] on 
persons that are of an hot constitution, are apt to fevers, inflammations, hæmorrhages, 
erysipelas, herpes &c such as are asthmatic, consumptive, scrofulous, gouty, such as have weak 
nerves, are hysteric, hypochondriac, or have bad eyes; & others you may think of.”22  Statistics 
cut a path through this thicket.  But the answer Jurin returned to his correspondent is that he 
would not inoculate “in any of these circumstances . . . unless the danger from the infection in 
the natural way be very great & pressing.”23  Apparently, while Jurin as a statistician was willing 
to suspend consideration of the subject’s condition, he had no intent to do so in clinical 
practice.  A man with a pragmatic turn of mind, he was concerned to validate a specific 
procedure of potentially great importance, not throw into question the foundations of 
medicine.  The first aim was consistent with the ends of the Royal Society, of which he was an 
officer; the second not.  But one wonders how many would quality for inoculation if all were 
excluded who had the wrong constitution or suffered from an ill-defined condition like weak 
nerves or had bad eyes.     
 While Jurin proposed these limitations to the practice of inoculation in a private letter, 
he implied quite as much in a public pamphlet.  Whereas Nettleton emphasized the careful 
medical management of inoculation even while admitting that many patients appear to need 
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no preparation beforehand and no medicine afterward, Jurin urged strict medical control of 
inoculation even though his tables suggest that it has few casualties no matter who performs it: 
 
Great care ought to be taken to inoculate none but persons of a good habit of body, and 
free, not only from any apparent, but, as far as can be judged, from any latent disease; 
for which reason, every prudent person will, in this case, have the advice and opinion of 
his own physician, whether the subject to be inoculated, be in a fit condition to undergo 
the small pox; that so [sic] he may not have that distemper, and a bad constitution, or 
perhaps another disease, to struggle with at the same time; of which there have been 
several fatal instances, through the neglect of this caution.24   
 
Inoculation should be managed case by case, it seems.  Emphasizing the necessity of careful 
medical supervision and the dangers of inoculating indiscriminately, Jurin reaffirms the focus on 
the individual patient and his or her constitution and state.  He now sounds like a physician 
concerned to reconcile a novel procedure with customary theory and practice, or to rein in a 
procedure often carried out by unsupervised surgeons or miscellaneous freelancers (including 
some, known to him by report, who simply inoculated themselves).25  Can this be the same 
author who so recently held up the example of a certain matron in the Middle East who 
inoculated untold thousands without loss of life?  For that matter, does Jurin really mean that 
people guilty of “luxurious living and drinking to excess” are in no state to be inoculated, as he 
appears to say in his last report to the public?  And if judicious medical oversight is so 
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important, then why have “so few” died of inoculation despite the general disregard of medical 
precautions, as he emphasizes paradoxically in the same passage?26 
Recall that in 1723 Jurin posited that if people are inoculated “without regard to the 
healthiness or unhealthiness of the subject,” as in New England, one in 60 can be expected to 
die, whereas in England the figure is one in 91.  While inoculation mortality in New England 
seems surprisingly low considering “how rashly our patients, even whole families together, 
rushed into this practice,”27 the lesson appears to be that it will go even lower if discerning 
physicians (or perhaps responsible surgeons acting as their surrogates) exclude unfit subjects.  
However, the leading inoculator in England at the time, Nettleton, whose record was 
excellent,28 gives no indication that he screens subjects case by case; rather, our impression is 
that people seek him out.29  In any case, it was only for the sake of argument that Jurin gave the 
figure of one in 60, his original point being that even on the construction of the evidence most 
unfavorable to inoculation, the practice is still many times less dangerous than natural 
smallpox.  The source of Jurin’s information about the smallpox epidemic in New England 
actually maintains that no one in New England died as a result of inoculation.   
That source is Cotton Mather, himself a member of the Royal Society.  As Jurin duly 
notes, Mather in a letter dated March 10, 1721 avows that while “five or six” New Englanders 
died after inoculation, not one died as a result of it.  Excerpted in and appended to Maitland’s 
pamphlet of 1722 in defense of inoculation, the text of the letter contains the following passage 
flagged by Maitland as remarkable:  
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How many lives might have been saved, if our unhappy physicians had not poisoned and 
bewitched our people with a blind rage . . . against the method of relief and safety in the 
way of the small pox inoculated?  I prevailed with one physician to introduce the 
practice; and the experiment has been made upon almost three hundred subjects in our 
neighbourhood, young and old, from one year to seventy; weak and strong, male and 
female, white and black; in midsummer, in autumn and winter: and it succeeds to 
admiration.  I cannot learn that anyone has died of it, though the experiment has been 
made under various and marvelous disadvantages.  Five or six have died upon it or after 
it; but from other accidents.30   
 
To the extent that a single locality could, the New England story meets Wagstaffe’s demand for 
repeated trials under different conditions.  And on this showing, zero mortality—that is, the 
absence of any death caused by inoculation itself, as opposed to a pre-existing condition or 
subsequent “accident”—was achieved with the inoculation of all comers, pell mell, amidst the 
desperation of an epidemic: an outcome that would seem to cast doubt on the need for 
physicians to select inoculees with the utmost caution.  Why does “great care” need to be taken 
in the choice of inoculees if a miscellaneous company of some 300 souls not screened in any 
way were inoculated without a single fatality specific to the procedure?   
In his first report to the public on the practice of inoculation (1724), Jurin reviews each 
of the nine English cases in which someone was suspected to have died as a result of 
inoculation over the years 1721-23.  He then tabulates the chance of death from inoculation, 
given the number of these fatalities the reader deems actually due to the procedure.  (Thus, if 
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the reader believes seven of the nine resulted from inoculation, the hazard ratio will be one in 
about 63; but with only two of the nine, the ratio shrinks to one in about 221.)  By the time 
Jurin published this breakdown, he had already received a copious letter from Mather 
discussing, among other things, the misattribution of the cause of death in the “five or six” New 
England cases.31  But in the 1724 report Jurin doesn’t mention those cases, notwithstanding 
that (a) a table in the same report shows high smallpox incidence and mortality in Boston; (b) 
more inoculation was done in Boston than any town in England, including London, according to 
another table; and (c) Jurin states categorically that he has included “every person, as far as I 
have been able to learn, that has either by the friends, or adversaries, to this practice [that is, 
inoculation], been suspected to have died of inoculation.”  The fact is that Jurin knew in some 
detail about five or six alleged fatalities—no trivial number in this context—absent from his 
analysis. 
Why this omission?  Possibly because reviewing the New England cases and proposing 
them one by one for reclassification (as with their English counterparts) would jeopardize the 
principle that inoculees must be chosen with “great care” and limited to persons in “perfect 
health,” as Jurin puts it in the same pamphlet.32  The raw statistics themselves at this point (in 
1724) suggest no appreciable difference in inoculation mortality between England and New 
England.  If we use Mather’s higher figure of six alleged fatalities and the total of 300 
inoculations in New England used by Jurin in 1723, we get a ratio of one in 50.  In Jurin’s 1724 
report on inoculation, the corresponding figures for England are nine alleged deaths in a total 
of 477 inoculations, or one in 53.  This near-identity is not what we would expect if the New 
England way of non-selective inoculation made the procedure significantly more dangerous.   
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The difference between practices of inoculation on either side of the Atlantic can be 
overstated.  For one thing, as England became more familiar with inoculation over the course of 
the 1720s, many seem to have sought out the procedure without bothering to get medical 
advice at all.33  It could no longer be said that inoculation was discriminating in England and the 
opposite across the sea.  Furthermore, it’s probable that on both sides of the Atlantic parents 
begged to have their children inoculated and physicians (or others) complied, regardless of 
Jurin’s or anyone else’s strictures and precepts.  As Maitland puts it,  
 
If a person, from the experience of the fatality of the small pox in general, or in his own 
family in particular, should resolve to engraft his child, any physician who should 
dissuade him from it might, in a great measure, be chargeable with the fatal 
consequences of the neglect of a method which the parent had proposed as the only 
means to save his child’s life.34 
 
With respect to the inoculation of children, the physician is in no position to be selective; and 
according to one of Jurin’s tables, children under ten made up more than half of the inoculees 
in England by 1724.  (After all, the older you are, the more likely you have already been exposed 
to smallpox.)  Most of the nine deaths Jurin identifies as possibly misattributed to inoculation 
happen to involve children.  It was because parents “very desirous . . . to preserve” their three 
surviving children prevailed on Nettleton to inoculate them after the fourth had died of 
smallpox that he consented to inoculate the child who, in the event, died after but not because 
of the procedure.35 
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While Nettleton suggests but does not emphasize that he treated all who sought him, 
Mather emphasizes with considerable flair the inclusivity of the work of the “one physician” in 
Boston he was able to enlist.  By 1724, Zabdiel Boylston had already inoculated no fewer than 
247 persons (to Nettleton’s 80).  Inundated with pleas for inoculation, he gave the treatment to 
a virtual cross-section of humanity, including not only whites and blacks (as Mather notes) but 
Indians.  And despite not choosing inoculees as advised by Jurin, Boylston—like Nettleton—
often found no need for preparations before or medicines after.  We cannot say how many 
New Englanders would have been denied inoculation if Boylston had limited himself to 
candidates in perfect health, but it happens that a dozen whom he successfully inoculated did 
suffer from one condition or another—hysteria, inflammation, asthma, poor constitution—that 
under Jurin’s rules would specifically bar inoculation, except in a dire emergency.  Who knows 
but that some of the inoculees were also guilty of luxurious living.  
Mather evidently conferred with Boylston before sending his account of the “five or six” 
disputed deaths to Jurin, as it roughly agrees with the account given by Boylston in his own 
pamphlet in defense of inoculation.  But even though Jurin was well aware of Mather’s 
informed claim that the inoculation of all and sundry in New England caused not one death, 
even though he celebrates the perfect record of the Greek woman of Constantinople, and even 
though he concedes that the rush to inoculate in England itself—regardless of the condition of 
the subject—has resulted in very few casualties, still he will not go so far as to exempt 
inoculation from the physician’s oversight.36  Only the physician has the knowledge and 
experience necessary to identify and veto unfit subjects—on the basis of an open-ended list of 
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disqualifiers.  Though Jurin endows statistics with power, they do not have the power to 
override the case-by-case practice of medicine.   
Jurin advanced a statistical method of assessing the practice of inoculation while 
remaining a case-minded physician steeped in medical tradition.  In his last report to the public 
(1727), he laments that many race to get themselves inoculated “without any preparation for it, 
whether by evacuations or a temperate regimen,” and without considering the season.  There 
speaks the tradition of Hippocrates.  At the time, inoculation was described as a kind of 
engrafting, and we might say that proponents like Jurin engrafted the procedure itself onto 
their customary modes of thinking and doing.  In Jurin’s case the transplant was particularly 
awkward, in that inoculation had already broken through the limitations he imposed on it by 
the time he picked up his pen.  Significantly, the next turn of the statistical argument following 
the 1727 report was the use of Jurin’s ratios to estimate the lives that would be saved if 
inoculation were practiced across the board—440 in the town of Bury alone, given the 
inoculation of everyone who has not already had smallpox.  Though the author, David Hartley (a 
physician), mentions his discussions with Jurin, nothing could be further from his intentions 
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